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Abstract: The contradictions inherent in interests of stakeholders in oil politics 
have escalated to armed confrontations in the oil-producing Niger Delta region 
of Nigeria. Years of unrealised development aspirations of the Niger Delta 
people and environmental crisis in relation to oil spillage and gas flaring have 
encouraged resistance against the oil industries and the state in the region. The 
manner of this resistance and state responses have undergone the process of 
militarisation in the last decades. The paper, which is qualitative in nature and 
thus drawing much from secondary data establishes that a series of political 
solutions, including support for zoning of Nigerian Presidency to the Niger 
Delta, and policy initiatives such as the amnesty programme for militants have 
helped to subdue the crisis. However, oil and environmental politics remains 
militarised for the state and resistant groups in the Niger Delta. Consequently, 
this article seeks to examine the nature and context of the socio-political crisis 
in the Niger Delta and the challenges and prospects for sustainable peace in the 
region.    
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Introduction 
The rise of Goodluck Jonathan as the 
first Nigerian Vice-President (2007-
2010) and President (2010-2015) from 
Niger Delta is a political landmark in 
the region and Nigeria as a whole. Also, 
the introduction of Amnesty 
Programme (AP) for militants in the 
region by late President Umaru Yaradua 
in 2009 is significant to peacebuilding 
in the region. Although these factors 
delegitimised militancy and created 
relative peace in Niger Delta, it is not 
totally a holiday for pirates, kidnappers 
and the disaffected (ex-) militants. 
However, the peace process became 
disrupted at an alarming rate between 
2015 and 2016 when the Niger Delta 
Avengers (NDA) among other groups 
renewed militancy in the region. The 
groups like their predecessors hanged 
their grievances on unrealised 
development aspirations of the people 
of oil producing Niger Delta region, 
which is connected to the aggressive 
quest to maximise profit at minimum 
cost to oil corporations, and the 
centralisation, corruptionand 
militarisation measure of the oil-
dependent Nigerian federation at the 
detriment of the region. 
 
Regardless of recent development, 
ecological crisis born out of the 
activities of Oil Corporations, economic 
underdevelopment andpolitical 
marginalisation of the Niger Delta 
people in Nigeriacontinue to be major 
sources of grievances in the 
region.Thoughthe region‘s history is not 
without violence or aggressive 
advocacy, the oil producing 
communities have peacefully protested 
their political marginalisation and 
ecological vulnerability until the socio-
political and environmental conditions 
developed more frostily and state  
 
responses also become actively 
militarised. These largely encouraged 
the emergence of radical movements 
seeking to challenge the oil 
beneficiaries namely, oil corporations, 
state and federal governments and some 
members of the political class. Despite 
a series of political and policy 
initiatives however, crisis has remained 
an enduring subject in oil and 
environmental politics in the Niger 
Delta. Against this background, the 
article seeks to examine nature and the 
context of the crisis, and the prospects 
for peace, in the Niger Delta region.  
 
Oil and Environmental Politics in the 
Niger Delta 
Oil prospecting in Nigeria dates back to 
1908 when a German firm established a 
bitumen company to undertake 
exploration for bitumen in the coastal 
area between Lagos and Okitipupa 
(Oketa and Tobi, 2001:155). Before the 
colonial windup, oil was discovered in 
Oloibiri community in 1956 by Shell 
D‘Arcy, a company that received a sole 
concession to operate in Nigeria in 
1937. Production in commercial 
quantitycommence in 1958. The 
country‘s production capacity rose from 
initial 5100 barrels per day (bpd) in 
1958 to 900,000 bpd in 1970 and now 
2.7 million bpd in 2017 (NNPC, 1999; 
2017). The discovery of oil in Niger 
Delta was celebrated in the region, in 
the hope that oil increases their ability 
to influence the central government to 
better their condition. This is important 
for a region that is dominantly 
populated by several ethnic minority 
groups, who are contending with 
‗majoritarian dictatorship‘ of 
Hausa/Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba in the 
federation. 
 
Oil accounts for about 40% of Nigerian 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
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70% of government revenues.The 
aggressive global oil quest that follows 
the 1970s oil shuck is a landmark in 
Nigerianpolitical economy history. 
Skyrocketing oil price in 1970s brought 
post-civil war Nigerian military elites, 
led by General Yakubu Gowon, in 
contact with petrol-dollars, which has 
continued to dictate the breath of 
Nigerian government and politics till 
date. In an attempt to consolidate the oil 
field for gushing transnational 
investors, the Mineral Act of 1914 was 
replaced with Petroleum Act of 1969. 
For effective control of the natural 
resources, most especially the fossil 
fuel, government introduced the Land 
Use Decree in 1978, apportioning all 
landed property to the state 
governments on behalfof the federal 
government. 
 
In an attempt to create favourable 
condition for the investors, little 
attention has been paid to the condition 
of the oil producing communities. The 
implications of Land Use Act in Niger 
Delta is that the federal government 
collect rent fees, while the state 
government received compensation on 
lands use by oil corporations, hence, 
individuals and their oil rich 
communities are alienated. The crisis 
busted when government‘s claim to 
ownership of land began to flood the 
feudal system that premised the 
region‘s subsistence culture. The local 
communities were made to understand 
that the resources: air, land, and water 
that link them with their ancestors are 
no more under their jurisdiction. 
Though similar claims to ownership of 
land dated back to colonial era, but such 
claims remain largely abstract, for it has 
not really displaced the traditional land 
lords system in the region.  
 
In addition to land alienation, Niger 
Delta was further ecologically 
threatened by the activities of the oil 
corporation that causes excessive oil 
spillage in host communities. Between 
2000 and 2015, Nigeria reportedly 
produced 33,136,101,351 million 
standard cubic feet (mscf) of natural 
gas, amidst which 31 per cent or 
10,290,099,374 mscf were flared. At 
the same time, 2.4 billion metric tons of 
oil was lost mostly spilled in the Niger 
Delta (NNPC, 2000-2015). The 
implications of both oil spillage and gas 
flaring ranges from displacement of job 
to violent clashes for the control of little 
created by surplus available resources. 
Omotola (2006:10) pointed out that ―for 
one thing, due to incessant oil spillages, 
the people have been deprived of their 
main sources of livelihood, that is 
fishing and farming. This is because oil 
spills have inflicted unimaginable levels 
of damage on farmlands and rivers such 
that they can no longer sustain soil 
nutrients and aquatic resources‖. 
Aghalino (2011:177) further 
acknowledge that ―the health of the 
environment and the lives of the people 
are intertwined with the health of the 
water system. The food, water and 
cultural identity of many local people 
are closely related to the delta 
ecosystem‖. Also, the relationship 
between reduction in tradition 
opportunities (farming and fishing), 
without another, can be a better 
stepping stone to understand 
competition for scarce resources that 
has been created by abundance in the 
region.  
 
The implications of environmental 
degradations extend to declining health 
condition in some of the communities. 
Chronic cough, catarrh, stooling, 
headache, miscarriage, cholera and 
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many other form of sickness have been 
reported. Beyond physical deprivation 
or displacement, the impact of oil 
spillage extends to spiritual life of these 
communities. For example, the Ogoni 
environment which once teemed with 
wildlife, was the food basket of the 
region and the abode of Ogoni spirits 
and deities, has been reduced to a 
wasteland by an ecological war waged 
by Shell(Agbonifo, 2011:254). The 
natural environment that conserves 
community‘s ancestral spirits is said to 
have been affected by the 
denaturalisation of the environment and 
vulnerability of their descendants. 
 
The politics of oil spillage propel 
numerous demands from compensation 
to autonomy by various oil producing 
communities. These demands informed 
a blame game between government and 
oil companies. Not until the emergence 
of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his Ogoni-led 
uprising, government continued to 
wallow in an enclosed belief that the 
activities of the corporation causes oil 
spillage and they should be responsible 
to the communities whose environment 
are damaged with limited state 
regulation to that effect. Equally, Ukeje 
(2001:342) observed that Niger Delta 
‗also witnessed an acute neglect by the 
oil companies, who argue that it is 
beyond their corporate callings to play 
the role of an alternative government 
and provide social amenities and 
infrastructure to their host communities. 
It is believed by the corporations that 
finance of any infrastructure facility 
should go hand in hand with target goal 
of maximising profit not community 
service‖. Hence, development was not 
given adequate attention by concern 
stakeholders in the Niger Delta perhaps 
until recently. 
 
As part of the efforts to deny 
responsibility for environmental 
degradation and ignore the 
requiredinterventions, government and 
the oil companies have considerably 
embarked on aggressive and expensive 
propaganda against the claims of the 
host communities. Because of this 
information deficit, we are out of touch 
with reality and are also standing on a 
dangerous shelf of oil-dependent, 
corporate-induced information 
starvation (Hoffmann, 1999:105). 
Aghalino (2009:285) pointed out that 
―there is of course the warped 
declaration that oil pollution does not 
degrade the environment to the extent 
popularly imagined. Before now, spill 
studies conducted by oil companies, or 
their consultants, attempt to minimize, 
or at best deny, the environmental and 
socio-cultural impact of oil pollution‖. 
Specifically, Shell International 
reportedly launched a £20 million 
corporate communication campaign in 
March 1999 in order to boost the 
company‘s tarnished reputation 
following several public relations 
disasters. Equally, after Ken Saro-Wiwa 
and eight other Ogoni leaders were 
hanged, the government was reported to 
have paid some foreign media to 
counter-informationon its inhuman act 
that received international criticism 
(Omotola, 2006). 
 
For regime survival amidst Nigeria‘s 
patrimonial politics, governmenthave 
embarked on some development 
spearheaded policies in the region. One 
of the government policy responses 
include state creation and derivation 
(Amuwo, et al, 1998). Niger Delta is 
now made up of 9 of the 36 states in the 
federation, compared to 1960 when it 
was peripheral of both Eastern and 
Western regions. The revenue 
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collectable by oil producing states for 
derivation was also raised from 1 per 
cent in 1970s to 13 per cent since late 
1990s, although it is below 50 per cent 
as obtainable in the early 1960s. 
Various institutions were also created to 
manage oil and environmental politics 
in the region. The Niger Delta 
Development Board (NDDB) was 
established in 1961, Oil Mineral 
Producing Area Development 
Commission (OPADEC) in 1992, Niger 
Delta Development Commission 
(NDDC) in 2000 and National Oil Spill 
Detection and Response Agency 
(NOSDRA) among others. For all these 
efforts, however, there are concerns 
whether the government is only doing 
this to ensure peace and security for the 
benefit of the oil sector, or is it 
genuinely interested in human 
development in the region without oil-
motivation (Usodike and Isike, 2009) 
 
Oil corporations in Niger Delta also 
embarked on corporate social 
responsibility to reduce its own blame 
in the oil politics. At the core of the 
corporate social responsibility is the 
recognition that profitability and social 
improvement go hand in hand (Eberly, 
2008:49). Barnes (2005:12) pointed out 
that ―of the five Shell companies 
operating in Nigeria, four have 
community development offices. One 
devotes $60 million a year, or 3 percent, 
of its in-country operating budget, to 
community development‖. In most 
cases, oil corporations construct roads, 
schools and clinics and provides 
scholarship, employment opportunities, 
drugs, electricity and portable water in 
many host communities in the Niger 
Delta. Despite these efforts, however, 
political corruption undermines the 
prospect planned actions. The alliance 
between national elites and local elites 
for self-satisfaction conspire against the 
development of the region. While local 
elites embezzled the funds allocated 
fromthe federation account into the 
region, the national elites have decided 
to keep their eye blind to this, in order 
to retain some of their supporters. Oil 
Corporations also bribe state officials to 
overlook or downplay the misdeeds in 
their activities. In this manner, there are 
allegation that local elites and relatives 
are largest beneficiaries of some of the 
so called corporate social responsibility. 
 
Militarisation of Resistance and State 
Response  
The grievances of the Niger Delta 
peopleover oil and environmental 
politics in Nigeria assumed a phase of 
both civil and militant mobilisations 
against the state and oil corporation in 
the last three decades. However, the 
history of anti-state mobilisation in the 
Niger Delta can be traced back to the 
pre-colonial era, when Jaja and Nana 
consciously defended their economic 
interests against British Imperial state. 
The declaration of Niger Delta Republic 
by Isaac Boro and 150 volunteer forces 
on February 22, 1966 in Tantonabau, 
which latter turned to 12 days 
revolution,is historically significant in 
the region‘s political advocacy. The rise 
of Ken Saro-Wiwa marked a turning 
point in the history of advocacy in the 
region, as it concretised the politics of 
oil spillage and attract the attention and 
partnership of environmentalists and 
human right advocates nationally and 
globally. Mass unemployment, poverty, 
land alienation for peasant population 
and displacement of aquatic employees, 
raised grievances against the state and 
oil corporations. Timid and inadequate 
state responses in implementing 
environmental and minority friendly 
policy, and the whole complexity 
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surrounding distribution of oil wealth 
further popularised the anti-state 
mobilisation in the region. 
 
Though Nigerian government has 
always employed ‗carrot and stick‘ 
response to advocacies inNiger Delta, 
blood spillage characterised its record 
of crisis management in the region. 
Starting with civil advocacies, the cost 
of production disruption and its effect 
on state revenue, propelled government 
to deploy and maintain combat ready 
military and police to defend its 
interests shared with oil corporation and 
non-oil producing states in the Niger 
Delta.Aghalino (2006:311) observed 
therefore that ―while it may be cynical, 
for oil, Nigerian government is 
prepared to submerge the Niger Delta in 
blood. In a way it may be fair to stress 
that the shedding of blood has been part 
of Nigerian government‘s oil policy.‖  
 
Ibeanu and Momoh (2008:14) also 
pointed out that ―the Nigerian state is 
itself a source of insecurity. State 
security agencies constitute a veritable 
threat to the security of the citizens of 
Nigeria. More often, rather than restore 
peace and order, they exacerbate crises, 
ramping up social and political 
tensions‖. Besides, there are many 
counter-advocacies that introduced 
confusion and animosity, withdirect or 
indirectinvolvement of actions or 
inaction of the state, which inspired a 
series of communal and ethnic conflicts 
in the Niger Delta. 
The Nigerian state has deployed 
security forces, which have records of 
campaigns of terror against the people 
of the Niger Delta, through a series of 
operations of various military task 
forces, Rivers state Task Force and the 
Joint Task Force that is compliment by 
the activities of mobile police known as 
‗kill and go‘, State Security Service 
(SSS), and the Directorate of Military 
Intelligence (DMI) (Aborisade, 
2010:77; Osaghae, 2008:202). State 
campaigns of terror are evident in 
Egbema (1989-91),Oburu 
(1989),Umuchem(1990), Bonny 
(1992),Egi-Obaji (1994), Tai-Biara 
(Ogoni) (1994),Ubima (1995),Odi 
(1999) (Chukuezi, 2009:101).During 
the Ken Saro-Wiwaled Ogoni uprising, 
his people were assaulted by the 
military and police (either regular or 
camouflaged as neighbouring militias). 
At the same time, government is 
believed to have instigated Andonis and 
Okirikas against the Ogoni people in 
1993. In this process, more than 1,000 
people lost their lives and 30,000 
people rendered homeless (Omotola, 
2009: 139). In response to the killing of 
twelve policemen by Egbesu Boys of 
Africa in Odi, Bayelsa State, in 
November 1999, President Olusegun 
Obasanjo deployed troop into the 
village. This operation reportedly 
emptied the village and left about 2000 
villagers dead, while 50,000 people 
were displaced. Gbaramatu Kingdom in 
Delta State is another hotspot of state 
terror in Niger Delta the turn of the 21st 
century (Tamuno, 2011). 
 
The Niger Delta conflict began as 
genocide but later became a war. At the 
initial stage, government is believed to 
assault helpless citizens that raised their 
interests in the oil politics; this led to 
the rise of radical armed groups against 
the state, its security forces and the oil 
interests that they are defending in the 
region. As a witness and victim of the 
genocide era, Ken Saro-Wiwa predicted 
the ―war in the delta‖ (Maier, 
2000:110). Collier (2010:103) observed 
that ―guns became necessary if your 
opponents have them‖. The presence 
and activities of the military in the 
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region radicalised civil society groups 
in the region.The security forces reign 
like imperial king in this region; their 
activities include extra judicial killing, 
assassination, and disguised invasion of 
hostile villages inform of inter-
community warfare(Aborisade, 2005; 
Joab-Peterside, 2005; Tamuno, 2011). 
The security support received by the 
corporations from the state, popularised 
the belief that government value oil 
more than human security in the Niger 
Delta. It is thus paradoxical that rather 
than guarantee social and economic 
security, oil became a source of 
insecurity to the aborigines, and rather 
than a guarantor of human security in 
the delta, the state has become its major 
violator (Sampson, 2009:31). Hence, 
state (military) and corporate 
(ecological) terror inspired the 
militarisation of Niger Delta youths.  
 
The militarisation of state responses to 
civil advocacies in the Niger Delta 
militarised some of the advocacy 
groups and their strategies in the region. 
In a bid to improve security against the 
state, some of them energised 
community spirit for militant 
mobilisation. Different armed groups 
thus emerged to coherently platform 
sporadic uprising into organised 
militancy. Amidst this, there were the 
Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), the 
Niger Delta Peoples Volunteers Force 
(NDPVF), the Niger Delta Vigilant 
(NDV), the Movement for the 
Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), 
the Niger Delta People‘s Salvation 
Front (NDPSF), the Coalition of 
Militant Action (COMA), the Bayelsa 
Volunteers, the Niger Delta Resistance 
Movement, and the Niger Delta 
Militant Force Squad (NDMFS). Some 
of the groups started as a political 
machinery, and subsequently developed 
into militant platform for societal 
grievance (Tamuno, 2011). Some also 
started as a pirate groups, cult and other 
forms of criminal gangs (Ukiwo, 
2007).Raging communal and ethnic 
conflicts in the region in the turn of 21 
century also encouraged youths to pick 
up arms. Equally, factionalism and 
fractured movement also led to 
proliferation of militant groups in the 
Niger Delta.  
 
The Niger Delta crisis is attended by 
kidnapping,sabotage, maritime piracy, 
insurgency, and opens confrontations 
with state force by militants. Annually, 
hundreds of people fall victim of 
kidnapping by militants, pirates and 
opportunists for ransom,which can 
range from N500,000 to N1 billion 
(Oyewole, 2016a). Grievous youths 
constantly vent their anger on the oil 
corporations with attacks against their 
installations to the detriment of 
production activities. Oil and gas 
supply is obstructed through 
vandalisation of pipelines, oil theft and 
illegal refineries. Shipment of oil and 
gas and other commodities in the Niger 
Delta, Nigeria‘s territorial waters and 
the Gulf of Guinea and their supply in 
the global market is threatened by 
frequent attacks, kidnappings, 
hijackings and theft by pirates and 
armed robbers (Oyewole, 2016b). More 
alarming, state security forces are also 
targeted for attacksto undermine 
perceived government-corporation 
hard-line. The implications of this 
hotness is felt through reduction in oil 
production by corporation, tax paid to 
the federal government and insecurity 
in the region and beyond. Hence,a 
significant percentage of the oil rent 
received by the state goes to defence,for 
procurement of military hardware to 
defend oil workers and installations.  
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Over the years, the widespread civil 
resistance in the Niger Delta has 
degenerated into lawlessness and 
disorder that criminalised many youths. 
Militancy has turnedinto a profitable 
business upon which warlord gained 
surplus values and from where 
unemployed youth secured a 
comfortable monetise living. Decent 
work does not pay well enough when 
kidnappingis likely to net a cash haul 
equivalent to a government employee‘s 
entire career earnings (Offiong and 
Cocodia, 2011:173; Oyewole, 2016a). 
Hence, Niger Delta militants cannot be 
denied of criminality and lust for 
plunder, despite their ideological 
motivation. Though most of these 
militant groups have incentives that are 
beyond grievances that were formerly 
recognised, they undoubtedly make the 
region hot for oil corporations and 
Nigerian government in retaliation for 
perceived environmental injustice. As 
militarised state response generates 
terror in the efforts to undermine 
environmental terror, the Niger Delta 
experiences turned out to be ―less oil, 
more blood and more fire‖ (Ibeanu, 
2000:19). 
 
Peace by Peaceful Means and its 
Challenges  
The prevailing insecurity that was 
witnessed in the Niger Delta since the 
turn of 21st century has raised the 
course of the region to the top of 
national security agenda in Nigeria. 
Beyond the military and policing 
responses of the state, a series of 
conflict management strategies have 
been exploredalso in the Niger Delta. 
Prominent among these are dialogues, 
political concessions, developmental 
policy and institutional building. 
Amidst these, the emergence of 
Dr.Goodluck Jonathan as the first 
indigene of Niger Delta to become 
Nigerian Vice President (2007-2010) 
and President (2010-2015) is a 
significant concession for peace process 
in the region.Equally, President 
Yar‘Adua (2007-2010) accorded 
priority to Niger Delta issues, 
recognised the limitation of military 
solution, and initiated peace dialogue in 
2008. In 2009, the federal government 
succeeded in negotiating with the 
militants and other stakeholders in the 
Niger Delta.In this process, Amnesty 
was granted to 20,192 militants, of 
which 15,000 of them surrendered 
2,760 assorted guns, 287,445 rounds of 
different calibre ammunition, 18 
gunboats, 763 dynamite sticks, 1,090 
dynamite caps, and 3,155 magazines,to 
receive state pardon (Maiangwa and 
Agbiboa, 2013:74; Obi and Rustad, 
2011:204).  
 
The Amnesty programme entails a 
robust disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR). Militants were 
paid for arms and ammunitions 
surrendered, as an incentive to embrace 
amnesty and address proliferation of 
small arms and light weapons (SALW). 
Amidst these, the military in 
collaboration with repentant militants 
identified and destroyed several militant 
camps across the creeks of the Niger 
Delta (Tamuno, 2011). The former 
combatants who registered for the 42-
month period of training, reintegration 
and rehabilitation in government-
designated residential training centers 
received a monthly allowance of NGN 
65,000 (USD 410) over the same period 
(Maiangwa and Agbiboa, 2013:74). Ex-
militants were also sponsored for 
studies locally and internationally, and 
encouraged/assisted to set up legitimate 
business.Amidst these, security 
contracts to protect oil installations 
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were given to ex-militant leaders. The 
Nigerian Maritime Administration and 
Safety Agency (NIMASA) awarded a 
pipeline surveillance contract worth 
$103.4million (about N15 billion) to 
Tompolo‘s company—Global West 
Vessel Specialist Limited (GWVSL) in 
2011.AsariDokubo, Dagogo, Egberi 
Papa, got N2 billion contract to also 
secure the oil pipelines in Bayelsa and 
Rivers States, while N580 million 
contract was awarded toBoyloaf‘s 
company (This Day, 2013). 
 
The Amnesty programme has received 
mixed reception among the militants 
and reactions in the public. Although 
Amnesty relatively delegalize militancy 
in the Niger Delta, some militants also 
rejected it. The post-amnesty campaigns 
of John Togo, one of MEND 
commander, and his Niger Delta 
Liberation Force (NDLF) is a 
prominent case. This also explain the 
bombing of a political rally in Bayelsa 
on 29th December 2010 and 1 October 
2010 that almost marred the Nigeria‘s 
50th Independence anniversary 
celebrations. Equally, the attractive 
incentives that are attached to DDR 
encouraged some of the youths that 
were initially peaceful before the 
amnesty to embrace violence. This is 
evident with the emergence of Urhobo 
Revolutionary Army (URA) in 2011 
and Liberation Movement of the 
Urhobo People (LIMUP) in 2013. 
Competition for security contracts 
among militant leaders also led to 
proliferation of agitation movements 
like Coalition of Urhobo Ex-Militant 
Agitators (CUEA), Coalition of 
Urhobo/Isoko Ex-Militant Leaders and 
the Urhobo Gbagbako and associated 
violence (Oyewole, 2018). Though 
Nigeria was able to raise its annual 
production capacity for crude oil from 
2008 to 2010, it started to decline again 
from 2011; while growth in gas 
produced was consistently followed by 
decline in the immediate year (NNPC, 
2015).  
 
More alarming, the multi-billion dollars 
amnesty and Jonathan Presidency 
achieved little success in mitigating the 
record of criminal violence, such 
sabotage or oil bunkering, illegal oil 
refining and kidnapping and armed 
robbery in waterways and piracy in 
Nigeria‘s coasts and the Gulf of Guinea 
(GoG). At least, 14,986 incidences of 
sabotage against pipeline were recorded 
in Nigeria between 2011 and 2015 
(NNPC, 2015). Although pirate attacks 
decline in Nigeria from 40 in 2008 to 
about 10 in 2011, Nigerian-based pirate 
groups expanded their operations to the 
neighbouring countries and the GoG. 
Benin with no record of pirate attacks in 
2010 recorded 20 attacks in 2011 and 
Togo also recorded 28 between 2011 
and 2013 (Oyewole, 2015). Several 
illegal refineries alsoemerged across the 
creeks, and together with vandalism, 
they added to the environmental crisis 
and mostly responsible for a series of 
fire disasters in the Niger Delta region 
(Onuoha, 2009; NNPC, 2015). 
Kidnapping for ransom by faceless 
groups is also undeterred (Oyewole, 
2016a). 
 
Although there is a decline in 
popularity of militant advocacy in the 
Niger Delta, the root causes of the crisis 
in the region is yet to be fully resolved 
despite some progress report in some 
fronts.There are enduring demand for 
increase in allocation and transparency 
with oil revenue, economic 
development, poverty reduction, job 
opportunities, and sustainable 
environment in the region. While the 
gas flaring is on decrease, the oil 
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spillage has increased. Oil product loss 
through rupture and attacks against 
pipelines rose from 110,380 metric tons 
in 2009 to 482,810 metric tons in 2015, 
while gas flared has reduced from 35.42 
per cent to 11.65 per cent of total 
production, which is between 2.1 and 3 
trillion mscf (NNPC, 2015). Notably, 
when Shell spilled 40, 000 barrels of oil 
in Bongain 26th December 2011, and 
was fined $5billion by National Oil 
Spill Detection and Response Agency 
(NOSDRA), media war and deceit 
politics was used to downplay the 
claimed effects of the spill (Amaize, 
2012;Umukoro, 2012). In 2015, 
however, Shell agreed to pay the 
residents of the Bodo community in the 
Niger Delta US$84million (£55m) 
settlement for two oil spills in 2008 and 
2009. Hence, 15,600 affected fishermen 
reportedly received $3,300 each for 
losses caused by the spills and the 
remaining $30m was used for 
community project (BBC, 2015). 
 
The Niger Delta peace process also 
confronted a series of political 
challenges at the federal level. At the 
initial stage of Boko Haram crisis, 
many northern politicians equate the 
group with MEND. President Jonathan 
was criticised for political fatigue in 
criminalising the 2010 Independent Day 
bombing by MEND. Prior to 
2013/2014, therefore, many from the 
Northadvocated for amnesty for Boko 
Haram, creation of Federal Ministry of 
Northern Affairs, elimination of 
derivation share of revenue to oil 
producing Niger-Delta to increase 
allocation to less developed north, 
among others (Oyewole, 2013). Some 
even criticised the idea of sending ex-
militants for training abroad in strategic 
fields, which can be explored in 
confrontation against the federation in 
future. ThesethreatenedJonathan 
Presidency, one of the bases of a 
peaceful Niger Delta. In 2012, 
AsariDokubo, the founder of NDPVF, 
―warned that any attempt to remove 
Jonathan from power forcefully could 
lead to civil war...It is because of 
Goodluck Jonathan that we kept quiet. 
But soon, we will not be able to 
guarantee our patience any more‖ 
(Agbo, 2012:52-53). More ex-militant 
leaders directly or indirectly declared 
their support for Jonathan towards the 
2015 Presidential election, and raised 
public fear that the defeat of the Niger 
Delta indigene in pull will not be taken 
lightly in the region.    
 
Beyond Jonathan and Amnesty: 
Challenges and Prospects for Peace 
Though Jonathan received more than 90 
per cent of the votes in the south-south 
and south-east, he turn out to be the first 
President of Nigeria to loss power to an 
opposition party/candidate through pull. 
Yet,he was widely commended for 
dousing tension down and ensuring 
peaceful transfer of powerto opposition 
party (Adeniyi, 2017). However, the 
President MuhammaduBuhari relatively 
tough stand or appearance against 
corruption threatened the beneficiaries 
of state patronage under the Jonathan 
Presidency in the Niger Delta and 
beyond. In view of records of 
allegations of missing funds under 
Jonathan and contrasting economy, 
Buhari initiated many probes in the 
early stage of his administration. Many 
indicting reports were released about 
the past administration, and some high-
ranking officials were arrested, detained 
and/or their assets forfeited to 
government. The new administration 
also declared its intention not to extend 
amnesty programme beyond 2015, 
when it supposed to wide up, and also 
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launched probe of security contracts 
awarded to ex-militants. In this manner, 
Tompolo was declared wanted by the 
anti-corruption agency. Also, state 
patronage of ex-militants reduced with 
the cut of Amnesty budget from N63 
billion in 2015 to N20 billion in 2016 
(Umoru and Erunke, 2016). 
 
Against this background, several 
individuals and groups started to 
emerge and gain popularity in the Niger 
Delta for their critical opinions and 
advocacies against what they brand as 
witch-hunting and sectionalism of the 
new government. More alarming, the 
relatively tough disposition of the 
administration against subversion 
became noticeable in the militarised 
war to protect oil facilities in the region. 
Nevertheless, Nigeria recorded increase 
in attacks against oil installations, thefts 
of oil product and proliferations of 
illegal refineries in the region in 
2015/2016. Amidst this, the Niger Delta 
Avengers (NDA) announced its 
existence in February 2016 and set the 
stage for a wave of militancy in the 
region (Onuoha, 2016). Other militant 
groups that emerged between February 
and August 2016 include the Reformed 
Egbesu Boys of the Niger Delta 
(REBND), the AdakaBoro Avengers 
(ABV), the Joint Niger Delta Liberation 
Force (JNDLF), the Niger Delta 
Revolutionary Crusaders (NDRC), the 
Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate 
(NDGJM), the Asawana Deadly Force 
of Niger Delta (ADFNG) and the Niger 
Delta Development Movement 
(NDDM). 
 
The militant movements declared a 
series of operations codenamed 
―Operation Red Economy‖, ―Operation 
Zero Oil‖ and ―Operation Crocodile 
Tears‖. These were accompanied by a 
series of attacks/bombing of oil and gas 
pipelines across the region. The militant 
campaign further worsened the 
ecological challenges in the region: the 
bombing of pipelines resulted into oil 
spills, gas flaring and wildfire, which 
had negative effects on the environment 
and the health and means of livelihood 
of many people in the affected 
communities. The reduction in oil and 
gas production/supply as a result of the 
militants activities and the decline in oil 
price in the global market, affected the 
budget of the state governments in the 
region, to the detriment of their capacity 
to produce public goods.The federal 
government lost N20 billion revenue 
monthly, which is connected to the 
2,560 cases of vandalism recorded, in 
2016. Due to attacks against gas supply 
lines, the electricity supplied by the gas 
power plants also dropped from 
3,004MW in December 2015 to 
1,715MW in December 2016 
(Oyewole, 2018). Also early in 2016, 
Angola displaced Nigeria as the 
foremost oil producingcountry in the 
continent. Maritime security in the 
coast of Nigeria, its neighbours and the 
Gulf of Guinea was also affected by the 
resurgence of Niger Delta militancy. 
Pirate attacks and armed robbery 
against ships in Nigeria‘s waters rose 
from 14 in 2015 to 36 cases in 2016 
(IMB, 2017). 
 
Against this background, the federal 
government raised the level of military 
presence and security engagements in 
the region. ―Operation Delta Safe‖ was 
announced by the Joint Task Force 
(JTF) in June 2016, while ―Operation 
Crocodile Smile‖ was launched against 
militancy by the Nigerian Army in 
August 2016. A coordinated land, sea 
and air campaign was launched against 
militants, pirates and illegal refineries. 
This led to a series of arrests and 
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intensified search and destroy of camps 
occupied by armed groups.Hundreds of 
illegal oil refineries were destroyed in 
this process. However, this did not 
bring the militant attacks or sabotage to 
an ends. Besides, many advocacy 
groups emerged with a demand and 
campaign for government to employ 
dialogue to resolve the security 
challenges. The rising cost of militant 
attacks also put pressure on the hawk in 
government to tone down military 
engagements at a middle of 2016, in 
order to give political solution a chance. 
 
Starting from July 2016, government 
entered into a series of dialogues with 
stakeholders in the Niger Delta. The 
Vice-President, Prof. Yemi Osinbajo 
also visited all the Niger Delta states 
and some of oil producing 
communities, and conducted a series of 
stakeholders meeting in this process. 
Amidst these, the pan-Niger Delta 
group, led by Edwin Clark, call on all 
the militant groups in the region to 
cease hostilities and give further 
dialogue a chance.Between August and 
September 2016, the group succeeded 
in persuading all the known militant 
groups in the region (Oyewole, 2018). 
Further dialogues have carried on root 
causes of the regional crisis. The 
2015/2016 wave of militancy like its 
predecessors is mainly anchored on 
unrealised development aspirations of 
the Niger Delta people, despite the fast 
resources that are available in the 
region for the purpose. This is further 
complicated by grievances on the 
environmental challenges in the region. 
Amidst these, there are widespread 
political corruption, poverty and 
inequality and youth unemployment. 
All these issues were raised in 
dialogues with the federal government, 
and factored into the subsequent Niger 
Delta development plan in 2017, of 
which its implementation is another 
subject of concern. 
 
Prominent among the federal 
government project in the Niger Delta 
since 2015 involves rail and road 
construction and rehabilitation. 
Modular refinery policy introduced in 
early 2017 by Acting President Osibajo 
to create job opportunities and replace 
illegal refineries was widely applauded. 
This will help to create environmentally 
friendly small scale refineries with 
safety precaution. At the same time, the 
attempt to relocate the headquarters of 
Multinational Oil Companies to the 
Niger Delta was also popular in the 
region, even though this was challenged 
by affected companies and it failed. 
Though government has committed 
efforts to clean up oil spill-affected 
environment in the Niger Delta since 
2015, the popular Ogoni clean-up has 
suffered more delay than 
expected.Despite some initiatives that 
raised hope recently, the menace of 
corruption, poverty, inequality, youth 
unemployment and environmental 
degradation remain major challenges to 
the people of oil rich Niger Delta. 
Equally, different forms of criminal 
violence and the militarised state 
responses in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria has remained a subject of 
national and human security debates.   
 
Conclusion  
This article explored the evolution and 
recent dynamics in oil and 
environmental politics, as well as its 
prospect for peace and conflict in the 
Niger Delta region. Years of unrealised 
development aspirations of the Niger 
Delta people, and environmental crisis 
in relation to oil spillage and gas flaring 
have encouraged resistance against the 
oil industries and the state in the region. 
     71 
Samuel Oyewole, et al                                                                                                            CUJPIA (2018) 6(1) 60-75 
 
The manner of this resistance and state 
responses have undergone the process 
of militarisation in last decades. Amidst 
these, a series of political solutions, 
including support for zoning of 
Nigerian Presidency to the Niger Delta, 
and policy initiatives like amnesty 
programme for militants considerably 
tame some of the crises. However, 
armed and criminal resistances and 
militarised state responses remain 
enduring in the Niger Delta. The level 
of political corruption, poverty, 
inequality, unemployment and 
irresponsibility in environmental 
management in the oil producing region 
have continued to encourage anti-state 
resistances through political and 
criminal means. More alarming, the 
crisis endured amidst a series of 
military campaigns and the attending 
human rights abuses in the region.  
 
Against this background, there is a need 
for the federal government to commit 
sustainable efforts to enhance human 
development and security. It is 
imperative to invest in infrastructural 
facilities and human capacity building, 
and encourage local initiatives and 
small scale businesses to reduce youth 
unemployment in the region. Policy on 
modular refineries deserve sustained 
commitments in this consideration. 
Institutional capacity to track and 
manage environmental crisis effectively 
need to be improved. The legislature 
need to increase its oversight on the 
Niger Delta question as it involves 
development, environmental and 
security aspiration of the people of the 
region. The court should be made more 
attractive to seek redress forland and 
environmental injustice. The security 
forces need to maintain adequate 
presence to guarantee security of lives 
and properties, and their engagements 
should involve minimum force and 
highest respect for the fundamental 
human rights of all the citizens in their 
areas of responsibility (AOR).The 
security forces also need to be well 
integrated into disaster management 
strategy in the region.More inclusive 
decision-making and implementation 
process will encourage understanding 
among stakeholders, and more 
transparent distribution and utility of oil 
wealth will promote public confidence. 
These will address some of the root 
causes of the crisis and increase the 
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